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ABSTRACT 
 
Regulatory use of the Precautionary Principle (PP) tends to be broadly characterized 
either as a responsible approach for safeguarding against health and environmental 
risks in the face of scientific uncertainties, or as ‘state mismanagement’ driven by 
undue political bias and public anxiety. However, the ‘anticipatory’ basis upon which 
governments variably draw a political warrant for adopting precautionary measures 
often remains ambiguous. Particularly, questions arise concerning whether the PP is 
employed pre-emptively by political elites from the ‘top-down’, or follows from more 
conventional democratic pressures exerted by citizens and other stakeholders from the 
‘bottom-up’. This paper elucidates the role and impact of citizen involvement in the 
precautionary politics shaping policy discourse surrounding the UK Government’s 
‘precautionary approach’ to mobile telecommunications technology and health. A 
case study is presented that critically re-examines the basis upon which UK 
Government action has been portrayed as an instance of anticipatory policymaking. 
Findings demonstrate that the use of the PP should not be interpreted in the pre-
emptive terms communicated by UK Government officials alone, but also in relation 
to the wider social context of risk amplification and images of public concern formed 
adaptively in antagonistic precautionary discourse between citizens, politicians, 
industry, and the media, which surrounded cycles of Government policymaking. The 
paper discusses the sociocultural conditions and political dynamics underpinning 
public influence on government anticipation and responsiveness exemplified in this 
case, and concludes with research and policy implications for how society 
subsequently comes to terms with the emergence and precautionary governance of 
new technologies under conflict. 
 Keywords: anticipatory governance; mobile telecommunications technology; 
precautionary principle; risk communication; Social Amplification of Risk 
Framework;  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Regulatory use of the precautionary principle (PP) is a recurring theme in 
health, environmental, and science and technology policy debates [1-6]. Advocates of 
the PP typically argue that adopting a ‘better safe than sorry’ approach addresses 
failings in the traditional machinery of governments to handle scientific uncertainties 
because it facilitates anticipatory policy debate and decision-making, which can allow 
for the forestalling of actions that could potentially threaten serious harm, or might 
otherwise lead to irreversible damage [4, 6]. Against this view, critics counter that the 
PP is ill-defined, incoherent, inconsistently applied, and lacks scientific credibility 
especially when its use narrows policy deliberations of countervailing risks or the 
weighing of costs and benefits across given activities [1, 7-11]. The PP is thus seen by 
critics as an unwelcome challenge to the dominance of economic and scientific policy 
discourse [6, 10, 12-14]. Consequently, questions commonly arise as to whether calls 
for precaution in policy discourse are more often employed to influence public 
confidence, or through a genuine interest to avert ‘real’ dangers and promote better 
knowledge and reasoned dialogue [5, 7-16].  
However, the general assertions commonly underlying explanations for and 
against the governmental use and impact of precautionary policy instruments would 
benefit from more precise understandings of how and why the political warrant for 
adopting precaution first emerges, how this is publicly articulated and interpreted, and 
with what effect [17- 19]. Particularly, academic and policy debates about the PP tend 
to adopt visions of scientific citizenship that imply respectively different concepts and 
appraisals of citizen understanding, participation and political influence in science and 
technology policy discourse [4, 20]. On the one hand, governmental use of the PP can 
be read as an attempt to ‘open up’ national debate about science, values and visions of 
the future of emerging technologies to participation with citizens whose valued input 
is thought to improve substantive knowledge as well as increase trust towards 
government more generally [6, 21]. In this form of precautionary discourse, citizen 
involvement in risk management is accordingly conceived to occur via ‘upstream 
engagement’ such that views are reflexively sought through consensual dialogue with 
decision-makers deliberating on pre-emptive regulatory options ahead of their 
implementation [18, 22, 23-25]. On the other hand, governmental use of the PP may 
be seen to arise in response to public dissatisfaction with existing regulatory 
provisions for safeguarding health and the environment [24]. In this view, 
precautionary discourse is more likely to be associated with social divisions or public 
fears over the future risks of emerging technologies irrespective of their benefits, and 
is often prompted by NGO lobbying and the social amplification of risk within 
climates of distrust [5, 15, 16, 24, 25, 26]. Consequently, questions abound 
concerning the possibilities for citizens to meaningfully understand, engage with, and 
contribute to precautionary policy debate in view of political constraints, the practical 
limitations of public expertise in science, the time and resource burdens of public 
participation, and the ability of citizens to challenge the dominant prescriptions of 
‘rational’ policy arguments on non-scientific and non-economic grounds [12, 15, 27-
29]. Such wide-ranging questions call for contextually based analyses to help 
elucidate the socially situated forms and dynamics that citizen participation in the 
‘politics of precaution’ take in practice alongside the conditions that support or work 
against the meaningful involvement of citizens in precautionary policy debate and 
reform [15, 17, 30].  
Addressing these issues, this paper critically re-examines the case of citizen 
involvement in the politics of precaution surrounding the UK Government’s response 
to the association of health risks with electromagnetic field (EMF) radiation exposure 
from mobile telecommunications technology (MTT). The UK Government’s 
decision-making on MTT and health is notable because policymakers are understood 
to have enacted precautionary measures on an ‘anticipatory’ basis in order to ‘keep 
ahead of public anxieties’ that had yet to significantly materialize [15, 31]. Which is 
to say, UK Government officials drew a political warrant for adopting a 
‘precautionary approach’ from a perceived need to proactively allay public concern 
about MTT health risks. This view is underscored by research accounts specifying 
that concerned citizens are unable to exert any meaningful influence on precautionary 
policy discourse due to difficulties in mobilizing national campaigns against popular 
technologies and their inability to challenge the views of official experts on health 
grounds [9, 15, 27, 32]. Explanations for UK Government precaution have instead 
focused on the prevalence of political elite insecurities over past scandals such as the 
BSE crisis, along with prompts by media scare stories [15, 33].  
Contrary to this received view, the main argument made by this paper is that 
accounts of the anticipatory basis of the UK precautionary approach to MTT and 
health are overstated. While the UK case is doubtlessly emblematic of the 
controversial application of the PP, we argue that it should not be understood in the 
simplistic anticipatory terms set out by UK government Ministers currently accepted. 
Instead, the UK Government’s use of precaution should be interpreted in relation to 
the wider political context in which the need for pre-emptive measures to be taken for 
MTT and health was also articulated and amplified by citizens acting in concert with 
politicians and the media. Specifically, we identify that community actions 
surrounding one localized mobile mast protest were especially instrumental in helping 
to crystalize public concern about MTT and health as a focal issue requiring a 
national Government response. We argue that the UK precautionary approach may 
accordingly be characterized as a ‘ripple effect’ arising through conventional Social 
Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF) processes [34] spurred by citizen actions 
from the bottom-up, as much as a ‘trigger event’ later instigated by government 
officials from the top-down.  
The paper has the following objectives: (1) to identify how public perceptions 
and perspectives about MTT health risks and precaution in the UK first arose; (2) to 
ascertain how and in what capacity local community stakeholders initially 
encountered and interacted with larger social systems and institutions with respect to 
MTT and health; (3) to specify the forms, content, and dynamics of community risk 
communications underpinning the social amplification of risk at different levels and 
over time; and (4) to elucidate what contribution risk amplification by community 
stakeholders made to the UK Government adoption of precautionary policy decisions. 
The paper proceeds by first outlining the ‘received official view’ that the UK 
Government’s precautionary approach for MTT and health best represented a form of 
anticipatory governance occurring ahead of health risks becoming an issue of public 
concern, along with the main research arguments currently supporting and contesting 
this understanding. We then describe the conceptual and methodological framework 
employed to guide our inquiry drawing together sociocultural and political 
perspectives on the SARF and the possibilities for local communities to adaptively 
influence wider risk amplification processes and impacts. This is followed by a 
detailed case study analysis examining how UK citizens contributed to national 
precautionary policy debate and discourse on MTT and health. Finally, we discuss the 
contextual conditions supporting risk amplification and the public interpretation of the 
need for precaution under conflict, and conclude with the wider research and policy 
implications of these findings. 
 
2. THE ANTICIPATORY BASIS OF UK GOVERNMENT PRECAUTION 
FOR MTT AND HEALTH 
 
The public emergence of MTT health fears in the UK initially centered on 
exposure to mobile handset radiation emissions, but soon grew to encompass the 
siting of MTT network infrastructure commonly known as ‘mobile phone masts’ as 
networks expanded into communities to meet phone signal coverage requirements 
[15, 35]. Health anxieties became more notably pronounced when the UK 
Government formally incorporated the PP into policymaking following its decision to 
appoint the Independent Expert Group on Mobile Phones (IEGMP) to conduct a 
major scientific inquiry into MTT and health uncertainties [15, 36]. The IEGMP 
appointment was explained by Tessa Jowell, MP, the UK Minister for Public Health, 
as a form of ‘anticipatory’ decision-making specifically intended to ‘keep ahead of 
public anxiety’ about MTT and health risks [37]. The IEGMP initiated a series of 
open meetings to receive public comment and the published findings, known as the 
‘Stewart Report’, that advised formally adopting a ‘precautionary approach’ [38]. 
Although stopping short of proposing an outright ban on MTT, the recommendations 
included pre-emptive restrictions on radiation exposure while further scientific 
research could be undertaken, alongside firmer planning controls to strengthen 
regulation of industry network siting and community consultation practices [38].  
The Stewart Report was welcomed and many of its main recommendations 
were accepted by the UK Government, albeit amidst demands by the national press to 
clarify whether MTT was ‘safe or not’, and criticism that adopting a precautionary 
stance had unintentionally and unnecessarily intensified public anxiety and confusion 
rather than provide reassurance [15, 39]. Nonetheless, in the received official view, 
the UK precautionary approach was characterized as an instance of ‘anticipatory 
governance’ [40] by which officials seemingly demonstrated a ‘reflexive motivation’ 
to ‘build capacities in foresight and engagement’ that would help scientists, policy 
makers and the public to better reflect on the issue of MTT and health. Supporting 
this view, Stilgoe [41] notes that the appointment of the IEGMP reformulated the 
question of scientific expertise and uncertainties about MTT and health as a ‘co-
production’ between experts and non-experts by allowing citizens and other 
stakeholders a greater say in the issues and concerns shaping future MTT regulation, 
research and deployment. Burgess [15] also observes that these measures were all the 
more remarkable because they took place before a public association between MTT 
and health risks had firmly materialized besides some small-scale local anti-mast 
protests and the persistence of some media scare stories in the local and national 
press. Burgess [15, 31] further argues that the adoption of precaution was thus not a 
concession won by a groundswell of public pressure, or a recognizable popular 
campaign against MTT, as might conventionally be the case, albeit sensitized citizens 
were actively campaigning against the siting of phone masts in their local 
communities. Walls et al. [32] likewise remark upon the ‘weak popular influence’ of 
early mobile phone mast protests, and conclude that ‘disparate campaigns’ struggled 
to establish ‘strong political momentum’ prior to the appointment of the IEGMP 
Inquiry.  
However, key questions remain as to why the UK Government then felt it 
especially necessary to adopt a precautionary approach in the absence of scientific 
evidence of harm or indeed wider public concern. Burgess [15] argues that the UK 
Government’s handling of MTT and health was primarily driven by the ‘politics of 
precaution’ starting with a crisis in confidence in institutions at the top of society 
spurred by past regulatory scandals associated with poor prior handling of the BSE 
crisis. In order to avoid another ‘BSE-type’ problem, precautionary policy measures 
were instigated pre-emptively from the top-down with the intention to proactively 
allay any further media interest, which Burgess [15, 31] argues had become a 
surrogate for public concern. In the event, UK Government actions arguably resulted 
in the opposite effect leading to heightened public concern when the use of the 
precautionary approach was first officially announced [15, 39, 42]. Yet, the extent to 
which citizens played a firm role in contesting the adequacy of scientific knowledge 
and safety regulations prior to the commissioning of the Stewart Report is a matter of 
further contention. Burgess [15, 31] acknowledges that some conventional democratic 
pressure by citizens was apparent, but mainly in the form of letters of complaint sent 
by constituents to their Member of Parliament (MP) focusing on environmental 
impacts rather than health concerns. By contrast, Stilgoe [41, 43, 44, 45] gives greater 
weight to an upsurge of written complaints made to the UK Government National 
Radiological Protection Board (NRPB) expressing health fears about MTT, noting 
that the early advisory response that ‘MTT radiation emissions met safety guidelines’ 
became an endpoint for discussion, and this ‘fragile discourse of compliance’ did little 
to address public confidence in those measures as a basis for public safety. To date, 
little further has been documented on the veracity of claims concerning the 
anticipatory basis of UK government precautionary decision-making or the role and 
capacities of citizen participation in the politics of precaution pre-empting the 
instigation of the IEGMP inquiry. Therefore, this study sought to address this 
apparent lacuna by elucidating how citizen involvement in the politics of precaution 
helped to shape national policy discourse and the basis of anticipatory decision-
making on MTT and health in the UK. Before proceeding with the case study, we first 
specify the theoretical and methodological framework guiding our inquiry. 
 
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The SARF was first introduced to broaden understanding of the complex 
social character and dynamics of societal responses to risk [36]. This framework is 
noted for providing instructive insights into why public responses to risk can often 
deviate from that which might be expected on the basis of expert risk assessments, 
and why the consequences of risk amplification and attenuation can often extend 
beyond expectations of direct physical harm [34, 46, 47]. The SARF principally 
describes two stages concerning ‘amplification’ in Stage 1 and ‘ripple effects’ in 
Stage 2 [47]. During the amplification stage, objects or events emerge and obtain 
‘signal value’ as they become perceived and attributed as a ‘risk’ typically following 
an incident or the identification of a new potential threat that elicits public concern 
[34]. The risk signal then accrues further social salience and significance as the 
circulation and flow of risk messages and images spreads through various channels 
and is filtered by ‘amplification stations’, such as when news media outlets publicly 
report the risk in question. In Stage 2, risk concerns intensify and reach into 
institutions leading to secondary impacts known as ‘ripple effects’, such as economic 
losses, the imposition of tighter regulatory constraints, or the stigmatization of 
technologies when different groups act on the risk information newly obtained [34, 
48]. Conversely, SARF also specifies that risk signals may also be socially attenuated 
such that concerns are dampened when risk information is ignored and downplayed, 
or the risk is thought to be satisfactorily addressed (46, 49-53].  
The SARF has since inspired a large body of studies that have employed the 
concept of risk amplification either as a general explanatory metaphor, or as a 
paradigm for guiding risk research and policy insights into how societal responses to 
risk emerge and unfold [46, 47, 54]. This research has shown that people’s risk 
perceptions often move in line with the expectations of amplification and attenuation 
mechanisms, that risk perceptions may be heightened or dampened by certain 
qualitative hazard characteristics, that risk events are given added signal value 
through disreputable actions, or the attachment of ‘stigma’ when the public image of 
an object, activity, party or location is tarnished or corrupted, and the media has a 
prominent role in shaping risk concerns [48, 49, 51, 55-58]. However, both 
proponents and critics of the SARF have noted that the ideas and explanations 
underpinning the ‘amplification’ and ‘ripple effects’ mechanisms would benefit from 
greater theoretical precision and further research attention [47, 59]. For example, the 
interactions between Stage 1 and Stage 2 can often remain unexplained [47], and 
SARF’s foundational reliance on the classic ‘sender-receiver’ model of 
communication arguably falls short of accounting for the cultural complexities and 
underlying power dynamics of the knowledge practices and social relations that 
underpin risk communication and the operation and wider influence of respective 
SARF components and processes [49, 59-61].  
In response, proponents of the SARF further note that risk amplification 
necessarily requires active interpretation and filtering of risk information and images, 
and that perceptions are not without consequence, otherwise risks would remain 
localized and irrelevant to wider communities [62, 63]. SARF studies have 
accordingly had a long standing interest in how ‘worldviews’, ‘strategic intentions’, 
‘organizational norms’ and other factors influence the interpretation and 
communication of risk signals integral to risk amplification and ripple effects [47, 64, 
65]. For example, the conceptual insights provided by the SARF have been used to 
help identify and examine interactions between social vulnerability to hazards, the 
distribution of social harms, and citizens’ recourse to environmental justice [64, 66-
68]. In turn, culturally and geographically situated accounts of the SARF have also 
specified that local values, social identities, and experiences of ‘place attachment’ 
shape the local constructions of risk, vulnerability, and responsibility, which provide 
an important basis and spur for public involvement in risk amplification [61, 69, 70]. 
The SARF has also been usefully extended to incorporate practical understandings of 
the ‘politicization of risk’ by underscoring how such aspects as ‘agenda setting’, 
‘finding salient workable solutions’ and ‘political expediency’ figure prominently in 
political responses to risks for example [53, 69]. Latterly, advances in information 
technologies and the growth of social media are newly recognized to provide an 
important means of risk communication that can potentially be customized by users to 
efficiently circulate, exchange and extend the reach of risk messages [71-74].  The 
SARF therefore offers a broad conceptual framework for establishing if, and by what 
means, risk amplification and attenuation has taken place, which can be integrated 
with other perspectives to investigate the qualities, emergence, development, framing, 
content, and impacts of risk messages, signals and discourse [49, 51, 57, 69].  
 Contributing to this literature, we wish to theoretically elaborate how practices 
of risk amplification by citizens can help to elevate personal vulnerability and 
objections to risk beyond a ‘local matter of concern’ to produce wider impacts at 
different social, political and economic scales over time [64, 75]. Particularly, we 
argue that risk amplification may at times characteristically reflect an ‘adaptive’ 
communicative response that is undertaken by citizens in ‘non-ideal’ contexts when 
local communities are confronted by intractable constraints and instrumental 
exchanges of risk related information, which are perceived to be against community 
interests [61; 76]. For example, past research indicates that citizens can assure wider 
public attention especially when they are able to rhetorically establish and renegotiate 
the boundaries of expertise and power underlying policy decisions, irrespective of 
official declarations of acceptable risk even in cases of mandatory technology rollout 
[27, 29, 34, 62, 77-80]. This follows observations that communities may engage in 
their own agenda building activities by appropriating different communication 
channels, such as the Internet, news media outlets, and political forums, as delivery 
vehicles for their own knowledge claims [81]. In this view, risk amplification and 
attenuation can occur not simply by way of heightened or dampened public 
perceptions arising from ‘passive information transfer’, but through ‘purposeful 
knowledge (co-)production and exchange’ when communities seek to reflect or 
reinforce risk understandings and concerns across places, at different levels, and over 
time [47, 60, 61, 82].  
To elaborate, ‘risk amplification’ may accordingly incorporate multiform 
modes of rational action, strategies and resources variously designed and employed to 
gain political commitment, social acceptance, and policy and systems support for 
communities that consider themselves to be ‘at risk’ [83]. The occurrence of ‘ripple 
effects’ would in turn be contingent upon the successful translation of disruptive 
knowledge and beliefs into wider social and political understanding and action [61]. 
In such contexts, the processes and dynamics of risk amplification can be best 
understood to closely align with ‘adversarial’, ‘advocacy’, or ‘issue orientated’ forms 
and models of communication in which protagonists aim to foster public policy 
debate, the initiation of a program, or the resolution of a problem within a field of 
contest, rather than a general on-going process of social and political change or an 
idealized form of deliberative dialogue [60, 61, 84]. To be ‘successful’ in this sense 
may therefore require a community to incorporate and tailor different amplification 
strategies to not only collect and rhetorically structure information for dramatic effect 
and garner public sympathy, but also to negotiate political subsystem knowledge 
boundaries and open up new communication channels in order to make a persuasive 
case, form alliances, and win political approval and support [79, 61].  
However, rather than falling into simplified notions of the inherent ‘agency’ or 
‘passivity’ of individual citizens, the practices associated with risk amplification are 
argued to be reflective of the adaptive capacities, sociocultural understandings, and 
communicative resources that are grounded in community membership, knowledge, 
learning and values [66, 85]. This is because the local context of people’s collective 
experience, learning, connectivity, and expertise contained within people’s 
‘organizational milieu’ provides key resources and motivational bases for variably 
enacting processes of reflexive interpretation, political inventiveness, and effective 
social action, which can potentially be brought to bear within a particular location or 
field of risk related activity in different places and over time [35, 61; 86, 87]. In this 
view, community vulnerabilities and potential responses to risk are as such inherently 
varied not only because communities differ in terms of their size, the scope of their 
collective norms, shared histories and sense of identity, but also their breadth of 
knowledge, the strength of their relational ties, along with the willingness of members 
to participate, and because these attributes and collective resources must also be 
strategically mobilized in an uncertain contest between competing parties  with 
respectively different energies, qualities and relative strengths [60, 63, 82].  
 
4. DATA AND METHODS  
 
The case study methodology employed a number of data collection strategies 
and sources of evidence focusing on historical instances of communicative action and 
‘actual social processes’ [88] that emerged during the early stages of the UK 
knowledge controversy over MTT and health. Initial desk research of media reports 
and Parliamentary records uncovered key details of one early public protest against a 
mobile phone mast that became the focus of this study. The data collection was 
subsequently extended through in-depth face-to-face interviews with 18 protest group 
members, 2 local newspaper journalists, 2 local NGO representatives, 2 industry 
representatives, and the local Member of Parliament associated with the protest. The 
research sample was recruited by initially contacting a small number of participants 
that had been publicly identified in newspapers and official records to be involved the 
protest, which was then extended through a ‘snowballing’ procedure.  
The interviews included a mixture of ‘narrative’ and ‘episodic’ questions to 
allow participants to tell the ‘biographical story’ of their participation in historical 
events, as well as to help clarify the ‘reality’ of concrete events they had constructed, 
the meaning that they ascribed to them, and how their perceptions of the issues 
surrounding the events informed their views [89, 90]. These accounts were 
triangulated with different data sources [91], including public documents and follow-
up interviews with key participants, to help to verify details as well as to crosscheck 
accounts and the interpretation of events developed in this paper. For example, during 
the interviews some participants made reference to documents and text sources, 
including newspaper reports, press clippings, campaign newsletters, press briefings, 
scientific literature, written correspondence, and websites, which were volunteered, 
provided upon request, or obtained independently through further desk research to be 
incorporated into the dataset. These primary materials are prioritized as supportive 
evidence in the case study narrative. While the location of the community protest and 
the identities of key participants involved in this research are publicly documented 
and have a public profile, the names of residents and other stakeholders have been 
changed or anonymized for confidentiality purposes.  
 
5. CASE STUDY FINDINGS 
 
5.1. The Battle of Whinney Lane  
 
In the early hours one October morning in 1998, construction workers for a 
major UK mobile telecommunications network service Operator began working in a 
field adjacent to Whinney Lane, a road situated in a small rural village bordering the 
North Yorkshire countryside. Using two small bulldozers, a crane and a digger, the 
workers broke through the field hedgerow and began excavating the site for a mobile 
phone mast, antenna and ancillary power supply cabin. Upon investigating the 
disturbance, residents were informed that the Operator had all of the legal means and 
planning support needed to develop the site, which was soon confirmed by a phone call 
with a local Council planning official. The residents convened a community meeting 
that evening to organize a series of actions against the mast development. They first 
obtained and closely scrutinized the mast development plans submitted to the local 
planning authority by the Operator thereupon discovering several inaccuracies and 
omissions. Particularly, the Operator had neither submitted the necessary landscaping 
scheme, nor obtained written permission, for removing the ‘listed’ (protected) ancient 
hedgerows bordering Whinney Lane. Contact with the Council for the Protection of 
Rural England confirmed residents’ suspicions that this meant the Operator had likely 
caused criminal damage. The residents petitioned Council officials about their 
discovery, but found them to be unwilling to discuss the development and denied 
residents the opportunity to raise their objections at the upcoming Council meeting. 
This ‘unsympathetic’ response by officials was considered by residents to stand in stark 
contrast to much more accommodating treatment of the Operator, which was permitted 
to submit application amendments that were approved retrospectively by the Council 
by phone 48 hours later. 
Following an Internet search, the residents became aware of alleged health risks 
associated with MTT.  They raised this with the Operator, but were told that phone mast 
safety was officially ‘guaranteed’ by the NRPB, and that it was no longer on the World 
Health Organization’s (WHO) agenda. However, the residents noted from their own 
search that the NRPB had stated it could not categorically rule out the possibility of 
non-thermal effects. Moreover, mast exclusion zones ranging between 150 and 500 
meters had been widely adopted elsewhere by local authorities in Denmark, Australia 
and New Zealand and closer to home in the neighboring county. Many residents then 
felt justified in rejecting the ‘official line’ by industry and government that exposure to 
MTT was ‘unquestionably safe’. Other residents, by contrast, felt less concerned by 
any potential health risks, but nonetheless thought the ‘health threat’ posed by this new 
technology would provide good ‘PR ammunition’ to support their campaign against the 
mast. Accounts of the Operator’s failed attempts to assuage residents’ health fears were 
also subsequently conveyed in a community campaign newsletter:  
 
There was also an ‘interesting’ presentation by a PR lady, apparently aimed at 
allaying our health fears. She talked of radio frequencies, saying that exposure 
to those at the ‘dangerous’ end of the spectrum (X-rays, radioactivity etc.) was 
akin to standing in a constant stream of Ping-Pong balls. Being subjected to 
mobile phone signals however, was to be hit by just a few Ping-Pong balls at 
intervals. Therefore safe. Question from the floor: ‘You can choose to have an 
X-ray whenever you like and the exposure is in fractions of a second. Exposure 
to mobile phone signals is compulsory and constant. Might there be cumulative 
effects?’ Awful silence and exchange of glances between [Operator] personnel. 
(Campaign Newsletter October 1998) 
 
The Operator’s attempts to trivialize MTT radiation exposure and its effects had not 
taken into account how such comparisons could be interpreted. Meanwhile, the risk 
comparisons made in communications by residents to explain public exposure to MTT 
and justify taking precautions were arguably employed with much greater force: 
 
With the lessons of X-rays, asbestos, CJD and smoking still fresh in our minds 
– all were considered “safe” to the public at one time or another – we think it’s 
only common sense to show a precautionary red flag to mobile phone masts and 
keep them well away from the public until we can be absolutely sure they are 
safe. (Letter to the Editor, Harrogate Advertiser October 1998) 
 
The residents also petitioned their local politician, Mr Phil Willis, Member of 
Parliament (MP), for his help, employing similarly tough and uncompromising rhetoric 
to set out the strength of ill-feeling towards the Whinney Lane mast development: 
 
The arrogance of the company defies belief. Not only do they arrive in our 
community unannounced and uninvited, they then plough through ancient, 
protected hedgerows, turn what was a pleasant field into a quagmire and attempt 
to erect a stark steel tower disfiguring the innocent brow of a hill. “Rape” is 
certainly the word that springs to mind. I don’t want to get overly dramatic about 
all this, but I do feel that [the Operator] has crashed into our midst, taken off 
with what it wanted and then sneered at our impotent attempts to resist while it 
hurried off to find another victim. Our innocent countryside has been violated, 
and [the Operator] has neither the sense nor the sorrow to help it onto its feet 
after the attack. Let alone apologize. But rapists don’t do they. (Whinney Lane 
residents’ letter to Mr Willis MP, 28 October 1998) 
 
While evidently deploying dramatic language about the environmental impacts, and 
rationalizing that past health risk lessons justified the need for precaution, the residents 
also indicated that they were not simply fighting against the technology the mast 
represented: ‘What’s at stake here is not only our unique and irreplaceable countryside, 
but also our belief in the accountability of our local elected representatives on the 
council and planning committee.’ (Residents’ letter to Mr Willis MP, 28 October 1998). 
Mr Willis, MP, agreed to lend his support to the residents’ protest against the 
development, and on the day the mast was delivered he joined an estimated 60 
protesters gathered at Whinney Lane whom had used their cars to form a blockade 
halting the movement of telecommunications equipment onto the site. During this 
disruption, the protesters fortuitously uncovered the mast delivered to the site did not 
match the design specified in the plans. A local Council official whom had been 
dispatched to address the protest conceded that this discrepancy was sufficient grounds 
to request the construction workers to withdraw from the site. Under further pressure 
from Mr Willis, MP, the Operator’s onsite representative agreed to a ‘stay of execution’ 
on the development while the MP could arrange to meet the Operator’s company 
Chairman to discuss matters.  
Following the initial forestalling of the development, a 2-month long protest 
ensued that residents described as best reflecting ‘a game of cat and mouse’ with the 
Operator. First, the residents left their cars in place to maintain the blockade as much 
as possible and commenced a ‘round-the-clock vigil’ over the site. In response, the 
Operator appointed security guards at the site to move the protestors on and keep 
disruptions to a minimum. Two lawyers amongst the residents determined that, while 
residents could not occupy the actual site on which the development was taking place, 
the security guards were nonetheless powerless to move them from the adjacent 
highways land in front of the site. This technicality established a legal basis for the 
blockade to continue. The protesters also turned the confrontations with security guards 
to their favour as further PR ammunition by publicly criticizing the ‘bullish tactics’ and 
‘rent-a-thug army’ employed by the Operator. Subsequently, the Operator’s community 
liaison officer informed residents that company workmen would be conducting an 
‘important’ site visit, but would not disclose the purpose. When the residents convened 
an emergency meeting at the site, along with local journalists that were now reporting 
on protest developments, they were met by the unusual scene of workers floating a 
telecommunications air balloon several meters above the ground. Residents were only 
then told that this was simply a routine transmissions test and that there was ‘no need 
to worry’. The incident was nonetheless considered a ‘ruse’ engineered by the Operator 
to make a mockery of residents and to try the patience of the journalists covering the 
protest. Afterwards, the Operator declared that they would proceed with the 
development, but intended to relocate the mast to an alternative site once one became 
available. The residents were by this point deeply distrustful of the Operator and 
dismissed these declarations of intent. When this information was relayed to Mr Willis, 
MP, it further transpired that the date of the development coincided with the meeting 
he had scheduled with the Operator’s senior representatives in London. The ensuing 
correspondence from Mr Willis, MP, to the Operator’s CEO and the National 
Acquisitions and Estates Manager iterated in no uncertain terms that the consequences 
of going against their prior agreement would likely entail a larger protest than before, 
a substantial media presence, and a massive boost of bad publicity to the ‘good name’ 
of the Operator (correspondence between Mr Willis, MP, and Operator, 10 November 
1998). 
 
5.2. Media amplification  
 
Recognizing the need to raise wider public awareness and support, one of the 
protesters, a professional copyrighter, crafted a ‘newsworthy’ story of the ‘Battle of 
Whinney Lane’ to ‘pitch’ to his contacts in the regional and national media. The various 
objections being raised were succinctly captured in a letter published in the local 
newspaper: 
 
In Whinney Lane and across the country, the democratic process is being 
sidestepped by a telecommunications company that exploits weak planning 
controls and ill-prepared Councils. [The Operator] is hell bent on erecting 
masts. In addition to growing concern at the possible dangers of mobile phones 
(Tuesday’s edition of The Sun had a two page spread on the subject) the 
National Radiological Protection Board cannot guarantee that there may not be 
non-thermal effects on residents living in the proximity of masts. The 
[Operator’s] site is four meters from a well-used footpath, 80 meters from where 
children play and 89 meters from housing with two large schools nearby. This 
should be a matter of great concern for the Council. (Letter to the Editor, 
Harrogate Advertiser 20 November 1998)   
 
These concerns were further backed up by the regional coordinator of Friends of the 
Earth in a follow-up Letter to the Editor that also drew attention to the consequences 
of ignoring potential health risks. The campaign also became a regular feature in the 
local press and on the local radio station, but not without receiving criticism from other 
residents pointing out that the protestors should not complain when they no doubt 
enjoyed the benefits of mobile phone ownership. Determining that being dismissed 
simply as ‘NIMBYs’ would undermine their cause, the protesters issued a strong 
rebuttal letter published the following week that set out their personal objections against 
the mobile phone mast, as well as the wider repercussions of mobile phone ownership 
in terms of health fears and impacts on the countryside that affected everyone.  
Following sustained petitioning of local and national media contacts the 
campaign was picked up as a four-minute feature segment on the BBC primetime 
consumer program Watchdog. While welcoming this, some residents held reservations 
that the program makers might view the complex issues surrounding their protest to be 
‘too indigestible for a modern media audience’. On the day of filming these fears were 
confirmed when the program makers arrived with a ‘ready-made script’ that portrayed 
the residents as a ‘well-bred army', and proceeded to orchestrate shots of protestors 
marching up and down Whinney Lane waving banners and singing ‘We Shall 
Overcome’. This footage was explained to be necessary in order to provide a visual 
focus and ‘human interest story’ to support the news angle of ‘little people versus big 
business and bungling bureaucracy’. Afterwards, the residents felt pleased that the 
broadcast drew favorable publicity and national attention to their cause, but were 
somewhat dismayed the segment turned out to be more a light entertainment piece than 
the serious investigation they had hoped for. Residents were also incredulous that the 
Operator had declined to take part in the program, making ‘no comment’ on the grounds 
that there was not enough preparation time. The Watchdog program makers later 
apologized to the residents for the way in which the segment had been produced, but 
informed them of widespread public support received for their stand against the 
Operator as indicated by the large volume of phone calls, emails, and letters sent to the 
program makers following the show. The program makers also alerted residents to 
fellow anti-mast campaign groups. 
Following the broadcast, Mr Willis, MP, secured a meeting between the 
residents, the Operator, and the local Council to try to form an agreement about the 
proposed developed. The residents were able to draw a number of concessions from the 
Operator. Particularly, the mast was now to be relocated a further 40 meters away from 
housing, and to help minimize visual impact the residents were able chose the style of 
mast they preferred following a chauffeur driven tour of phone masts around the region. 
The broken ancient hedgerow was replaced with new bushes and trees, and the field 
was re-landscaped. Yet, despite winning these concessions, the end outcome was not 
perceived to be a complete victory by all. Some residents were especially fearful of the 
health risks that might now be associated with exposure to radiation from the new phone 
mast residing in their community. Some protestors also felt that these concessions were 
‘hard won’ and made as part of a final ultimatum from the Operator to choose from two 
positions in which they could either take the least worst option without objection, or 
risk that the development would proceed on the Operator’s preferred position now the 
residents had exhausted all other available options in their fight against Council 
planning approval. 
 
5.3. Political Ripple Effects  
 
Following their national television appearance on Watchdog, the protestors 
received an invitation to form a delegation with Mr Willis, MP, to attend an inquiry 
called by the Northern Ireland Assembly at Stormont into the health risks associated 
with mobile phone masts. At the meeting scientists gave presentations on MTT safety 
and campaign experiences were shared. Mr Willis, MP also consolidated his 
commitment to residents to continue to lobby Government on the issue in Parliament. 
Subsequently, when back at Westminster Mr Willis, MP, became heavily active in 
objecting to the ‘policy of containment and expediency’ through which he accused the 
Government of disenfranchising his local constituents from the MTT planning process 
(personal interview Mr Willis, MP, 2002; see also [15]). Mr Willis, MP, gathered cross-
party support from fellow MPs who were also becoming increasingly inundated with 
letters from worried constituents about the health effects of mobile phone masts. 
Capitalizing on this groundswell of disquiet, in January 1999 Mr Willis, MP, 
successfully secured support for an ‘Early Day Motion and Question’ to be put forward 
to the House of Commons to present and debate the issues of MTT, planning, and public 
health. In what turned out to be one of the most well attended adjournment debates of 
the year, Mr Willis, MP, argued that his constituents had been badly let down by the 
planning and public health systems respectively. The case was then put to Parliament 
that planning arrangements were unduly weighted in favour of industry Operators 
against environmental and public health interests. To illustrate that this was not an 
isolated concern Mr Willis, MP, also highlighted that, in addition to the ‘swelling post-
bags’ of MPs and Ministers, the issue of mobile phone masts had in fact been the subject 
of 88 written questions tabled by MPs to the Department of Environment, Transport 
and Regions (DETR), 3 earlier Adjournment debates, and 3 Early Day Motions 
attracting 91 signatures from MPs. Pressing forward the key issue of MTT and public 
health Mr Willis, MP, reiterated the precautionary arguments first made to him by his 
constituents:  
 
Although I do not wish to be alarmist, I hope that the Minister agrees that neither 
his Department nor the Department of Health can categorically state that 
telecommunications masts and mobile phones do not pose a threat to public 
health […] After recent findings on smoking, passive smoking, asbestos and 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, any Minister would be foolish to rule out the 
possibility of a health risk (House of Commons Hansard Debates 18 January 
1999 pt. 39 [92]) 
 
Mr Willis, MP, then outlined in greater detail the available scientific evidence and 
scientific opinion of the WHO and the US Food and Drug Administration to make the 
case that the ‘jury was still out’ on the health risks, arguing that this called for the 
implementation of the PP:  
 
What I am a suggesting, and what the WHO is suggesting, is a cautionary 
approach. That would be in line with our obligations under the Maastricht treaty, 
which introduced the precautionary principle as a legal obligation in article 130-
r(2) of the treaty of Rome. (House of Commons Hansard Debates 18 January 
1999 pt. 39 [92]) 
 
Mr Willis, MP, then made proposals for revising current health and planning policies 
to curtail the activities of mobile industry Operators, which he argued would give much 
needed added security to residents, and in his closing argument made a final appeal to 
forestall another UK government health controversy: 
 
How much better to say in five years time that we were right to be cautious than 
to have another BSE-type problem heaped upon us (House of Commons 
Hansard Debates 18 January 1999 pt. 39 [92]) 
 
In response, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions, Mr. Nick Raynsford, MP, welcomed the debate, and making 
direct reference to Mr Willis, MP’s, constituents announced that new planning 
procedures would now be put in place to overcome the problems they had encountered:  
 
We believe that the new procedures will overcome the problems described by 
the Hon. Gentleman, and I hope that they will prevent any further sieges of 
Whinney Lane or anywhere else.  (House of Commons Hansard Debates for 18 
January 1999 pt 40 [93]  [emphasis added]) 
 
The Minister also accepted the ‘quite reasonable anxiety’ about the environmental and 
health impacts of MTT and offered reassurances to the MPs present that the NRPB 
guidelines were well established and consistent with other international guidelines. He 
also drew attention to an internal Parliamentary consultation that was now concurrently 
underway within the Department of Health, and closed by further assuring MPs that 
their concerns had been recognized and were being addressed: 
 
I stress that the Government are concerned, and are taking steps to deal with the 
problems that have been identified. We shall continue to pursue the research in 
respect of health risks that the Hon Gentleman has anticipated. I hope that he 
will accept that the real concerns he has voiced have been accepted by the 
Government. (House of Commons Hansard Debates for 18 January 1999 pt 40 
[93]) 
 
Three months later in April 1999, and before the internal consultation had concluded, 
the appointment of the IEGMP Inquiry into MTT and health was announced. The 
Stewart Report [38] acknowledged that there had been much political activity on MTT 
and health in the run up to the Inquiry and specifically credited Mr Willis, MP, as the 
foremost influential politician to raise the issue within Parliament. The MTT network 
service Operator involved in the Battle of Whinney Lane was singled out especially for 
criticism by the Stewart Report [38] concerning inadequate public consultation and 
siting practices. In anticipation of this outcome, the mobile Operators had appointed a 
new industry spokes-body to design and implement a nationwide public relations 
program to show it was now adopting a more ‘responsible’ approach for addressing 
community consultation requirements in a bid to offset the perceived need for further 
restrictive planning arrangements by the UK Government [41]. 
 
6. DISCUSSION  
This case study brings a necessary spotlight to the role and impact of citizen 
involvement in the social amplification of risk underpinning the ‘anticipatory’ 
adoption of precaution in the case of MTT and health in the UK. The findings 
primarily show that citizens played a stronger role in helping to spur the political 
warrant for adopting a precautionary approach for MTT and health than previously 
understood. In this section, we draw out some key analytical observations concerning 
the dynamics, processes and impacts of risk amplification exemplified by this case.  
 
6.1. Adaptive Capacities and Risk Amplification  
The case study indicates that the politics of precaution surrounding MTT and 
health in the UK were much more reflective of SARF processes and the exertion of 
conventional democratic pressure than previously thought. Past research focusing on 
the role and impact of citizen involvement has tended to downplay the possibility for 
citizens to make a meaningful contribution to national MTT and health risk policy 
debate on the grounds that, while the MTT health issue is national in scope, campaign 
efforts by sensitized individuals to raise wider public concern struggle to gain 
political momentum because the concerns articulated by sensitized citizens become 
subsumed by a disempowering ‘rational’ scientific discourse, which limits the 
potential for citizens to organize collective action and challenge expert knowledge 
[15, 27, 32]. The case study findings presented here demonstrate to the contrary that 
dissenting voices and localized civic resistance to MTT can make a wider national 
contribution to arguments for the role of precaution in health, science, and technology 
policy, and that multiform rationalities, resources, capabilities and influence of 
citizens should therefore not be pre-judged or overlooked [78, 90].  
Notably, while initially community resolve to fight against the mast cohered 
around the environmental damage and visual impacts the mast would have on the 
locality, community objections quickly grew to reflect multiple contestations against 
dominant presumptive scientific assertions and wider regulatory policy provisions 
[29], which to that point had facilitated the unquestioned disenfranchisement of 
citizens from mast siting operations in their local community. Particularly, the 
protestors managed to communicate their clear dissatisfaction with social relations of 
dependency and deference to official scientific, economic, and environmental 
arrangements, and then turn these constraints into wider justification for change that 
would in principle be to the benefit of everyone [29]. This also helped the campaign 
to stave off accusations of ‘NIMBY-ism’ and affirm a legitimate basis for resistance 
to the benefits of socio-technological progress [94] that subsequently resonated both 
locally and widely, with the story being picked up by regional and national media 
outlets and obtaining strong political support.  
From a ‘SARF’ perspective [34, 62], the Battle of Whinney Lane 
characteristically provided a focal risk event that obtained signal value giving rise to 
the circulation of risk messages that were in turn filtered by amplification stations 
through various channels such as local and national media. Adding to these 
observations, the case study findings contribute further contextual insights into how 
the local community operated adaptively as an agent of risk amplification in ‘non-
ideal’ circumstances. Particularly, a key salient dynamic of risk amplification 
concerned the confrontational manner in which the residents of Whinney Lane 
squarely objected to mast siting arrangements through deploying strategic actions that 
materially disrupted the development, appropriated knowledge and official 
documents, exploited legal loopholes, made health risk claims, and variously enrolled 
NGOs, political and media connections to the cause in order to help mobilize public 
support and to act as channels for the delivery of campaign messages. The 
antagonistic exchanges surrounding the Battle of Whinney Lane not only fueled 
community antipathy and resolve, but also reflected most poorly on the Operator 
when depictions of the poor treatment of the protesters were purposefully 
incorporated into community communications. This gave added ‘signal value’ to the 
cause by strengthening the basis upon which the protesters were able to publicly state 
and defend their grounds for vehemently disagreeing with siting practices and call for 
wider policy reform.  
Another consistent feature of the campaign was the sustained and adept use of 
tough and uncompromising rhetoric, which incorporated risk comparisons alongside a 
flair for deploying emotive language to effectively convey why a firm stance against 
mobile mast developments ought to be adopted. As similarly observed of other anti-
mast protests [15, 27], the protagonists of the Battle of Whinney Lane foregrounded 
‘risk’ and ‘precaution’ in their articulation of objections to MTT. This line of 
argumentation was chosen as much for the instrumental and symbolic value of 
attaching the ‘stigma’ of past health scares to current uncertainties about MTT and 
health as for any genuine health fears held by certain group members, but also 
contained reasoned justifications for adopting precaution. The success of these 
activities notably necessitated the effective deployment of wide-ranging sociocultural 
skills, competences and resources held within their organizational milieu in order to 
formulate persuasive arguments, make constructive alliances, and extend political 
influence beyond the local confines of the community into wider national media and 
political fields.  [47, 85].  The professional acumen, knowledge, experience, and 
relations held within the community were key to providing a shared basis for the 
alternative expertise, communicative competence, and political inventiveness needed 
to support on-going processes of reflexive interpretation and contestation of the many 
issues surrounding siting practices and the risks of MTT. Without which, the 
instrumental progression of risk concerns from a small rural community to the Houses 
of Parliament may not have met with such success. 
 
6.2 The Longue Durée of Precautionary Ripple effects 
The focus of the present case study notably looks beyond the formal 
application of the PP as a policy instrument under conventional circumstances, and 
instead places emphasis on the instrumentalities and practices of precautionary 
discourse that framed the political warrant for its use as they emerged and rippled out 
over time. National precautionary discourse can be understood to have first been 
underpinned by early local protest activities that prefigured the later opening up of 
more consensual opportunities for citizens to contribute to scientific and policy 
deliberations as might be conventionally expected of PP instruments [77]. The Battle 
of Whinney Lane was long and hard fought, requiring on-going efforts by the 
protesters to rebut criticism and forge of areas of common ground by making appeals 
to the wider democratic sensibilities and interests underpinning their case for public 
concern and policy reform [79]. The findings trace how precautionary arguments 
were first articulated by citizens, and how these local concerns about the impacts of 
MTT on the environment and public health were subsequently received by the media, 
and eventually rehearsed by their elected representative in Parliamentary discourse, 
eliciting a precautionary response from the UK Government. Insofar as the 
precautionary arguments surrounding the Battle of Whinney Lane appear to have been 
taken seriously by UK Government officials, the concessions directly drawn from 
Ministers in Parliamentary debate directly acknowledged that the concerns raised 
constituted an important public issue warranting further regulatory attention. The key 
declaration made by Ministers that citizens ‘had been heard’ and ‘official action 
would be taken’ thereby marked a clear break with the ‘fragile discourse of 
compliance’ that had previously characterized official risk discourse [43].  The 
‘anticipatory’ basis of precautionary decision-making by the UK Government was as 
such presaged by external public concern that was clearly articulated amongst 
politicians in the most well attended Parliamentary adjournment debate of the year.  
While it was not possible for this study to elaborate on the individual thinking of UK 
Government officials behind these pronouncements, the Battle of Whinney Lane 
clearly provided a concrete example of negative public sentiment towards MTT and 
health that would have helped to ‘cohere and amplify’ the diffuse public concerns 
contributing to the sense of anxiety that is said to have spurred politicians into 
precautionary action identified by Burgess [15]. Following this, we observe that UK 
precautionary measures were adopted more reactively and within a context of greater 
political ambiguity and antagonism than has previously been considered, and as such 
were characteristic of a SARF ripple effect [34]. Moreover, these broader contextual 
considerations may also contribute to further explanations of the controversial 
reception and apparent failure of official precautionary communications attenuate 
public risk perception following the publication of the Stewart Report [15, 39, 42, 95]. 
We suggest that public understandings about risk and intended precautionary actions 
were not simply confined to matters of passive information reception and consensual 
participation in ‘upstream’ deliberations [96], but also developed critically in view of 
wider politicized ambiguities about the competence, credibility and motivations of 
policy makers and industry, which has a bearing on public trust and deference to 
official decisions [25, 95-99]. Consequently, if the UK Government’s precautionary 
stance was seen to be a hard-won concession resulting from public and political 
pressure, this could ultimately have undermined official declarations of the 
anticipatory and proactive basis upon which policy makers portrayed themselves as 
behaving responsibly, and by which the goals of ameliorating concern and winning 
public trust might otherwise be presumed [32, 101, 102]. Nevertheless, the politicized 
discourse that prefigured official actions demonstrated the abilities of citizens to 
rethink health and environmental regulations in more precautionary terms that 
ultimately helped to spur more reflexively motivated policy understandings and a 
more consensual democratic  approach to MTT network siting practices by officials 
and industry in view of the imposition of a new technology that was proliferating in 
the apparent absence of public oversight or Government restrictions [40, 100]. 
 
6.3 Case study limitations  
Some limitations to the case study are also to be noted. Particularly, we 
caution against generalizing idealized conceptions of politicized risk citizenship that 
might be ascribed to the co-construction of the science and technology policy 
ostensibly implicated in this case [35, 43, 86]. First, the sociocultural resources, 
capacities and expertise adaptively deployed by protestors in the ‘Battle of Whinney 
Lane’ were integral to their success, but these attributes might not necessarily be 
available close at hand to other community protest groups, albeit knowledge can be 
shared and useful lessons learned vicariously within an active public sphere [60]. 
Second, UK Parliamentary constituency arrangements facilitate direct local contact 
between politicians and the citizens they represent, but this potential political channel 
for risk amplification might also not be directly replicated elsewhere. Third, the 
antagonistic relations and sense of disenfranchisement felt and publicly narrated by 
residents was a key contextual feature that served to add signal value to objections 
made during the Battle of Whinney Lane. However, the power of such arguments 
would be less clear cut in the case of later protests that occurred subsequent to the 
Stewart Report because of the openness of the IEGMP Inquiry to public input and the 
subsequent adoption of planning reforms that required better provision for citizen 
consultation by industry Operators and local councils to improve community relations 
[12, 27, 35, 22]. Fourth, it is noteworthy that the protesters were unable to maintain 
full control over their campaign narrative, which was regarded by the media to be 
insufficiently digestible in all its complexity. Rather, the story of the Battle of 
Whinney Lane gained traction as it was filtered through media amplification stations 
in part because it was simplified, reframed and repackaged to fit with traditional 
media tropes such as ‘David vs Goliath’ as exemplified by the portrayal orchestrated 
by the Watchdog program makers. While it might be speculated that nowadays 
traditional news channels and broadcasters can be circumvented through the use of 
modern social media environments that allow campaigners to directly author and 
extend the mass reach of their messages [71, 72], this may not necessarily directly 
correspond to greater risk amplification because the dynamics of digital 
communications are far from clear cut. The circulation of risk messages in social 
media is commonly subjected to distortion, manipulation, and fragmentation, 
alongside facing fierce competition with other content for attention, which thereby 
confers even less control and requires the adept use of a wider range of 
communicative competencies and skills [73, 74].  
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
This case study contributes to current research and policy understandings of 
the politics of precaution surrounding MTT and health in the UK by re-examining 
citizen involvement in the social amplification of risk preceding the UK 
Government’s official adoption of a precautionary approach. Actions by local 
community protesters are found both to have gained national media attention and to 
have prefigured a key Parliamentary debate that articulated citizen concerns and 
spurred the Government recognition of MTT and health as an important public issue 
warranting further regulatory attention in the months immediately preceding the 
appointment of the IEGMP. Furthermore, the risk amplification processes observed 
characteristically embodied adaptive responses by citizens to ‘non-ideal’ 
circumstances that called for creative risk communicative solutions in order to 
surmount immutable asymmetries contained within MTT network siting practices [61, 
76]. The form and dynamics of risk amplification were underpinned by 
socioculturally embedded processes of active sense-making and adaptive use of 
knowledge and communication resources and skills which animated the political 
possibilities for a vulnerable community to represent risk, escalate controversy, 
mobilize networks of resistance and counter expertise, and re-negotiate power 
relations, in contravention to accepted Government policy and scientific opinion [26, 
78-80].  
 
We conclude that the findings provide an important challenge to the received 
official view of the anticipatory basis of UK Government precautionary decision-
making, in which officials are portrayed to have acted pre-emptively and citizens are 
thought to have made little discernable contribution to national precautionary policy 
discourse. The ‘anticipatory’ basis of precaution rather reflected varying forms and 
styles of disclosure along with different logics through which pre-emptive actions and 
decisions about the future were understood, legitimized and realized by different 
stakeholders at different stages well before, during, and after the appointment of the 
IEGMP [20, 100]. Moreover, the broader context of antagonistic relations 
surrounding siting practices may also be an overlooked factor potentially contributing 
to explanations of the apparent policy failure of UK Government communications to 
garner public understanding and acceptance of the requirement for precautionary 
measures.  
The findings also attest to the importance of delineating how such issues as 
institutional maneuvering, group interactions, and political dynamics can act in 
concert with public concern to shape the way that risks are amplified, why policy 
responses are mobilized to address them, and the particular forms and impacts 
through which ripples take effect and manifest over time [53, 61, 69]. We suggest 
therefore that the conceptual understandings and findings elaborated in this paper help 
to provide further insight into the structure, stability and trajectory of associations 
between risk amplification and precautionary ripple effects over time, and call for 
further analysis of the political interactions and sociocultural conditions in which 
citizen involvement in techno-scientific controversies can contribute to the societal 
dynamics and impacts of risk [35, 70]. 
Following this, we conclude with a call for further critical examination of the 
risk amplification practices and contexts that precede the emergence and 
communication of ostensibly anticipatory policy decisions, and in particular how the 
political dynamics of pre-emptive policy decision-making differentially shape the 
emergence, development and public interpretation of precautionary policy measures. 
We recommend that studies which invoke or employ the SARF specify, if not indeed 
explicitly test, which underlying communication models best apply to describe risk 
amplification processes and mechanisms, and how this varies over time, because 
uncritical assumptions about the context and characterization of risk amplification and 
its effects may otherwise be misaligned or misplaced [60]. In some cases, criticism of 
ostensibly reasonable community responses and precautionary arguments that have 
arisen adaptively to fit the context of public vulnerabilities to risk, institutional 
constraints, and industry practices might be misdirected [76]. Incorporating these 
contextual considerations more explicitly into the SARF would help to foreground 
attention to the forming of linkages between community knowledge, performance and 
social relations in the rhetorical identification, production and negotiation of 
institutional subsystem boundaries thought to be key elements in bridging Stage 1 and 
Stage 2 risk amplification processes. Renewing this conceptual focus would fit with 
the general ambition expressed by proponents to be broadly comprehensive and 
sufficiently flexible to integrate new theoretical perspectives, illuminate the temporal 
and spatial duration and changing character of risk amplification and ripple effects, 
and to generate new policy insights across different social and institutional contexts 
[34, 56, 65]. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
[01] Aven T. On different types of uncertainties in the context of the precautionary 
principle. Risk Analysis, 2011; 31(10):1515–1525. 
 
[02] Garnett, K. and Parsons, D. J. Multi-Case Review of the Application of the 
Precautionary Principle in European Union Law and Case Law. Risk Analysis. 2016; 
doi:10.1111/risa.12633 
 
[03] Hansson, S. O. How to be Cautious but Open to Learning: Time to Update 
Biotechnology and GMO Legislation. Risk Analysis 2016; 36(8): 1513-1517. 
 
[04] Hess, D. J. To tell the truth: on scientific counterpublics. Public Understanding of 
Science. 2011; 20(5): 627-641. 
 
[05] Löfstedt RE. The precautionary principle in the EU: Why a formal review is long 
overdue. Risk Management, 2014a; 16(3):137–163. 
 
[06] Gee, D., Harremoës, P., Keys, J., MacGarvin, M., Stirling, A., Vaz, S. G., 
&Wynne, B. Late lessons from early warnings: the precautionary principle 1896–
2000. Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 2001. 
 
[07] Graham JD, Hsia S. Europe's precautionary principle: Promise and pitfalls. 
Journal of Risk Research. 2002 Oct 1;5(4):371-90. 
 
[08] Todt O, Luján JL. Analyzing precautionary regulation: Do precaution, science, 
and innovation go together?: Analyzing precautionary regulation. Risk 
Analysis, 2014;34(12):2163–2173. 
 
[09] Hom, A. G., Plaza, R. M., & Palmén, R. The framing of risk and implications for 
policy and governance: the case of EMF. Public Understanding of Science. 2011; 
20(3): 319-333. 
 
[10] Löfstedt RE. A possible way forward for evidence-based and risk-informed 
policy-making in Europe: A personal view. Journal of Risk 
Research, 2014; 17(9):1089–1108 
 
[11] Sunstein CR. Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle. Rochester, NY: 
Social Science Research Network, 2005. 
 
[12] Drake, F. Mobile phone masts: protesting the scientific evidence. Public 
understanding of science. 2006; 15(4): 387-410. 
 
[13] Hansen SF, von Krauss MK, Tickner JA. The precautionary principle and risk­
risk tradeoffs. Journal of Risk Research. 2008; 11(4):423-64. 
 
 
[14] Sandin P, Peterson M, Hansson SO, Rudén C, Juthe A. Five charges against the 
precautionary principle. Journal of Risk Research. 2002; 5(4):287-99. 
 
[15] Burgess, A. Cellular phones, public fears, and a culture of precaution. Cambridge 
University Press. 2004 
 
[16] Marchant GE, Mossman KL. Arbitrary and Capricious: The Precautionary 
Principle in the European Union Courts. Washington, DC: American Enterprise 
Institute, 2004. 
 
[17] Adams, M. D. The precautionary principle and the rhetoric behind it. Journal of 
Risk Research. 2002; 5(4), 301-316 
 
[18] Klinke A, Dreyer M, Renn O, Stirling A, Van Zwanenberg P. Precautionary risk 
regulation in European governance. Journal of risk research. 2006; 9(4):373-92. 
 
[19] Moreno C, Todt O, Luján JL. The context (s) of precaution: Ideological and 
instrumental appeals to the precautionary principle. Science Communication. 2010; 
32(1):76-92. 
 
[20] Tuler S. Forms of talk in policy dialogue: Distinguishing between adversarial and 
collaborative discourse. Journal of Risk Research. 2000 Jan 1;3(1):1-7. 
 
[21] McLean, C. and Patterson, A. The regulation of risk: Mobile phones and the 
siting of phone masts – the UK experience, Science and Public Policy. 2012; 39(6): 
827-836  
 
[22]  Rogers-Hayden T, Pidgeon N. Moving engagement “upstream”? 
Nanotechnologies and the Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering's 
inquiry. Public Understanding of Science. 2007; 16(3):345-64. 
 
[23] Klinke A, Renn O. Precautionary principle and discursive strategies: Classifying 
and managing risks. Journal of Risk Research, 2001; 4(2):159–173. 
 
[24] Stirling A. Risk, precaution and science: towards a more constructive policy 
debate. EMBO reports. 2007; 8(4):309-15. 
 
[25]  Wilsdon J, Willis R. See-through science: Why public engagement needs to 
move upstream. Demos; 2004. 
 
[26] Löfstedt RE, Bouder F, Wardman J, Chakraborty S. The changing nature of 
communication and regulation of risk in Europe. Journal of Risk 
Research, 2009;14(4):409–429. 
 
[27] Drake, F. Protesting mobile phone masts: risk, neoliberalism, and 
governmentality. Science, Technology & Human Values. 2011; 36(4): 522-548 
 
[28] Owens S. Siting, sustainable development and social priorities. Journal of risk 
research. 2004 Mar 1;7(2):101-14. 
 
[29] Wynne, B. Elephants in the rooms where publics encounter “science”?: A 
response to Darrin Durant, “Accounting for expertise: Wynne and the autonomy of 
the lay public”, Public Understanding of Science. 2008;17:21-33   
 
[30] Boholm Å, Corvellec H, Karlsson M. The practice of risk governance: lessons 
from the field. Journal of Risk Research. 2012 Jan 1;15(1):1-20. 
 
[31] Burgess, A. Risk, Precaution and the Media. In: Richter, Ingo K. and Berking, 
Sabine and Muller-Schmid, Ralf, eds. Risk Society and the Culture of Precaution. 
London: Routledge. 2006 
 
[32] Walls, J., O'Riordan, T., Horlick­Jones, T., & Niewöhner, J. The meta­
governance of risk and new technologies: GM crops and mobile telephones. Journal 
of Risk Research. 2005;8(7-8), 635-661. 
 
[33] Burgess, A. Media risk campaigning in the UK: From mobile phones to ‘Baby 
P’.  Journal of Risk Research. 2010;13(1), 59-72. 
 
[34] Kasperson RE, Renn O, Slovic P, Brown HS, Emel J, Goble R, Kasperson JX, 
Ratick S. The social amplification of risk: A conceptual framework. Risk analysis. 
1988;8(2):177-87. 
 
[35] Law, A., & McNeish, W. Contesting the New Irrational Actor Model A Case 
Study of Mobile Phone Mast Protest.  Sociology. 2007;41(3), 439-456. 
 
[36] Dolan, M., & Rowley, J. The precautionary principle in the context of mobile 
phone and base station radio frequency exposures. Environ Health 
Perspect. 2009;117(9): 1329-1332. 
 
[37] House of Commons Science and Technology Committee Minutes of Evidence 
(London, Stationery Office). 1999 
 
[38] IEGMP Mobile Phones and Health, W. Stewart (Chairman) (the Stewart report). 
Chilton: National Radiological Protection Board. 2000 
 
[39] Barnett, J., Timotijevic, L., Vassallo, M., & Shepherd, R. Precautionary advice 
about mobile phones: public understandings and intended responses. Journal of Risk 
Research. 2008;11(4): 525-540. 
 
[40] Guston DH. Understanding ‘anticipatory governance’. Social Studies of Science. 
2014;44(2):218-42. 
 
[41] Stilgoe, J. The (co-) production of public uncertainty: UK scientific advice on 
mobile phone health risks. Public Understanding of Science. 2007;16(1): 45-61. 
 
[42] Barnett, J., Timotijevic, L., Shepherd, R., & Senior, V. Public responses to 
precautionary information from the Department of Health (UK) about possible health 
risks from mobile phones. Health Policy. 2007;82(2), 240-250. 
 
[43] Stilgoe, J. Controlling mobile phone health risks in the UK: a fragile discourse of 
compliance. Science and Public Policy. 2005;32(1): 55-64. 
 
[44] Moore, A., & Stilgoe, J. Experts and anecdotes the role of ‘‘anecdotal evidence’’ 
in public scientific controversies. Science, Technology & Human 
Values. 2009;34(5):654-677. 
 
[45] Collins J. W. Mobile phone masts, social rationalities and risk: negotiating lay 
perspectives on technological hazards. Journal of risk research. 2010;13(5):621-37. 
[46] Kasperson, R. E., & Kasperson, J. X. (1996). The social amplification and 
attenuation of risk. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, 545(1), 95-105. 
 [47] Kasperson, J.X., Kasperson, R.E., Pidgeon, N., Slovic, P. (2003), ‘The social 
amplification of risk: assessing fifteen years of research and theory’, in: Pidgeon, N., 
Kasperson, R.E., Slovic, P.: The Social Amplification of Risk, Cambridge University 
Press, 13-46.  
[48] Flynn, J. (2003) “Nuclear Stigma,” in N. Pidgeon, R.E., Kasperson and P. Slovic 
(eds) The Social Amplification of Risk, pp. 326–52. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
[49] Burgess, A. (2012), Media, Risk, and Absence of Blame for “Acts of God”: 
Attenuation of the European Volcanic Ash Cloud of 2010. Risk Analysis, 32: 1693–
1702 
[50] Busby, J. S., Alcock, R. E., & MacGillivray, B. H. (2009). Interrupting the social 
amplification of risk process: a case study in collective emissions reduction. 
Environmental science & policy, 12(3), 297-308. 
[51] Lewis, R. E., Tyshenko, M. G. (2009), ‘The impact of social amplification and 
attenuation of risk and the public reaction to mad cow disease in Canada‘, Risk 
Analysis 29(5), 714- 728  
[52] Rickard, L. N., McComas, K. A., Clarke, C. E., Stedman, R. C., & Decker, D. J. 
(2013). Exploring risk attenuation and crisis communication after a plague death in 
Grand Canyon. Journal of Risk Research, 16(2), 145-167. 
[53] Rothstein, H. (2003). Neglected risk regulation: the institutional attenuation 
phenomenon. Health, Risk & Society, 5(1), 85-103. 
[54] Pidgeon, N., Henwood, K., & Maguire, B. (1999). Public health communication 
and the social amplification of risks: present knowledge and future prospects. Risk 
communication and public health, 65-77. 
[55] Bakir, V. (2005). Greenpeace v. Shell: Media exploitation and the social 
amplification of risk framework (SARF). Journal of Risk Research, 8(7-8), 679-691. 
[56] Barnett, J., & Breakwell, G. M. (2003). The social amplification of risk and the 
hazard sequence: The October 1995 oral contraceptive pill scare. Health, risk & 
society, 5(3), 301-313. 
[57] Frewer, L.J., Miles, S. and Marsh, R., 2002. The media and genetically modified 
foods: evidence in support of social amplification of risk. Risk analysis, 22(4), 
pp.701-711. 
[58] Löfstedt, R. E. and Renn, O. (1997), The Brent Spar Controversy: An Example 
of Risk Communication Gone Wrong. Risk Analysis, 17: 131–136.  
[59] Rayner, S. (1988), ‘Muddling through metaphors to maturity: A commentary on 
Kasperson et al., The Social Amplification of Risk’, Risk Analysis 8 (2), 201- 204.  
[60] Wardman, J. K. The constitution of risk communication in advanced liberal 
societies. Risk analysis. 2008;28(6):1619-1637. 
[61] Murdock, G., Petts, J., & Horlick-Jones, T. (2003). After amplification: 
rethinking the role of the media in risk communication. The social amplification of 
risk, 156-178. 
[62] Pidgeon N, Kasperson RE. Slovic, P. The social amplification of risk. Cambridge 
University Press. 2003. 
[63] Horlick-Jones, T., Sime, J., & Pidgeon, N. (2003). The social dynamics of 
environmental risk perception: implications for risk communication research and 
practice. The social amplification of risk, 262-285. 
[64] Kasperson, J. X., & Kasperson, R. E. (2005). The social contours of risk: publics, 
risk communication and the social amplification of risk (Vol. 1). Earthscan. 
[65] Renn, O. (2003). Social amplification of risk in participation: two case 
studies. The social amplification of risk, 374-401. 
[66] Cutter, S. L., Mitchell, J. T., & Scott, M. S. (2000). Revealing the vulnerability 
of people and places: a case study of Georgetown County, South Carolina. Annals of 
the association of American Geographers, 90(4), 713-737. 
[67] Dabrowska, E. M., Bates, J., & Murphy, B. L. (2012). Living near the" town that 
lost its water": Explaining residents' environmental concerns in a rural-small urban 
township in Ontario. Environments, 38(1), 57. 
[68] Turner, B.L., Kasperson, R.E., Matson, P.A., McCarthy, J.J., Corell, R.W., 
Christensen, L., Eckley, N., Kasperson, J.X., Luers, A., Martello, M.L. and Polsky, 
C., 2003. A framework for vulnerability analysis in sustainability science. 
Proceedings of the national academy of sciences, 100(14), pp.8074-8079. 
[69] Gowda, M. R. Integrating Politics with the Social Amplification of Risk 
Framework: Insights from an Exploration in the Criminal Justice Context. The Social 
Amplification of Risk. 2003;305-25. 
[70] Masuda JR, Garvin T. Place, culture, and the social amplification of risk. Risk 
analysis. 2006;26(2):437-54. 
[71]  Chung IJ. Social amplification of risk in the Internet environment. Risk 
Analysis. 2011 1;31(12):1883-96. 
[72] Fellenor J, Barnett J, Potter C, Urquhart J, Mumford JD, Quine CP. The social 
amplification of risk on Twitter: the case of ash dieback disease in the United 
Kingdom. Journal of Risk Research. 2017;27:1-21. 
[73] Garbett A, Wardman JK, Kirman B, Linehan C, Lawson S. Anti-social media: 
communicating risk through open data, crime maps and locative media. In 
Proceedings of HCI Korea 2014 Dec 10 (pp. 145-152). ACM and Hanbit Media, Inc.. 
[74] Wardman, J. K., Nothing to fear but fear itself? Liquid provocations for new 
media and fear of crime, in The Routledge International Handbook on Fear of Crime, 
Routledge, 2017; 
[75] Smit B, Wandel J. Adaptation, adaptive capacity and vulnerability. Global 
environmental change. 2006;16(3):282-92. 
[76] Gillespie A, Reader T, Cornish F, Campbell C. Beyond ideal speech situations: 
Adapting to communication asymmetries in health care. Journal of health psychology. 
2014 Jan;19(1):72-8. 
[77] Bröer C, de Graaff MB, Duyvendak JW, Wester RA. Engaging citizens: local 
interactions, policy discourse and courses of protest against mobile phone cell site 
deployment. European Journal of Cultural and Political Sociology. 2016;1-22. 
[78] Hess, D. J., & Coley, J. S. Wireless smart meters and public acceptance: The 
environment, limited choices, and precautionary politics. Public understanding of 
science. 2014;23(6): 688-702. 
 
[79] Kinsella, W. J., Kelly, A. R. and Autry, M. K. Risk, Regulation, and Rhetorical 
Boundaries: Claims and Challenges Surrounding a Purported Nuclear Renaissance, 
Communication Monographs. 2013;80(3):278-301 
[80] Motion J, Leitch S, Weaver CK. Popularizing dissent: A civil society 
perspective. Public Understanding of Science. 2015;24(4):496-510. 
[81] Driedger, Michelle S., 2008. Creating shared realities through communication: 
exploring the agenda-building role of the media and its sources in the E. coli 
contamination of a Canadian public drinking water supply. Journal of Risk Research, 
11(1-2), pp.23-40. 
[82] Paveglio TB, Boyd AD, Carroll MS. Re-conceptualizing community in risk 
research. Journal of Risk Research. 2017 Jul 3;20(7):931-51. 
[83] Freudenburg WR. Institutional failure and the organizational amplification of 
risks: the need for a closer look. The social amplification of risk. 2003 Jul 10:102-
120. 
[84] Servaes J, Malikhao P. Advocacy communication for peacebuilding. 
Development in Practice. 2012 Apr 1;22(2):229-43. 
[85] Wardman, J. K. Sociocultural vectors of effective risk communication. Journal of 
Risk Research. 2014;17(10):1251-1257. 
[86] Walklate S, Mythen G. Agency, reflexivity and risk: cosmopolitan, neurotic or 
prudential citizen?. The British journal of sociology. 2010;61(1):45-62. 
[87] Knoblauch H. Communicative constructivism and mediatization. 
Communication Theory. 2013 Aug 1;23(3):297-315. 
[88] Yin RK. Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 4th ed. Los Angeles, CA: 
SAGE Publications, Inc, 2008. 
 
[89] Jovchelovitch, S. and Bauer, M. Narrative interviewing, in M. W. Bauer and G. 
Gaskell (eds.) Qualitative researching with text, image and sound, 57-74. London: 
Sage. 2000. 
[90] Flick, E. Episodic interviewing, in M. W. Bauer and G. Gaskell (eds.) Qualitative 
researching with text, image and sound, 75-92, London: Sage. 2000. 
[91] Flick, U. Triangulation in qualitative research, in U. Flick, E. von Kardoff, and I. 
Steinke (eds.) A companion to qualitative research, 178-183 London: Sage. 2004 
[92] House of Commons Hansard Debates 18 January 1999 pt. 39 (London Stationary 
Office) 
[93] House of Commons Hansard Debates for 18 January 1999 pt 40 (London 
Stationary Office) 
[94] Freudenburg WR, Pastor SK. NIMBYs and LULUs: Stalking the syndromes. 
Journal of social issues. 1992 Jan 1;48(4):39-61. 
[95] Wiedemann, P. M., Schuetz, H., Boerner, F., et al. When precaution creates 
misunderstandings: The unintended effects of precautionary information on perceived 
risks, the EMF case. Risk analysis. 2013;33(10):1788-1801. 
[96] Claassen L, Bostrom A, Timmermans DR. Focal points for improving 
communications about electromagnetic fields and health: a mental models approach. 
Journal of Risk Research. 2016;19(2):246-69. 
[97] Binder AR, Hillback ED, Brossard D. Conflict or caveats? Effects of media 
portrayals of scientific uncertainty on audience perceptions of new technologies. Risk 
analysis. 2015;36(4):831-846  
 
[98] Boehmert C, Wiedemann P, Pye J, Croft R. The Effects of Precautionary 
Messages about Electromagnetic Fields from Mobile Phones and Base Stations 
Revisited: The Role of Recipient Characteristics. Risk Analysis. 2016 May 1. 
[99] Claassen L, van Dongen D, Timmermans DR. Improving lay understanding of 
exposure to electromagnetic fields; the effect of information on perception of and 
responses to risk. Journal of Risk Research. 2015;1-7. 
[100] Anderson B. Preemption, precaution, preparedness: Anticipatory action and 
future geographies. Progress in Human Geography. 2010;34(6):777-98. 
[101] de Graaff MB, Bröer C, Wester RA. Biomedical risks and citizenship: 
depoliticizing cell site deployment in the Netherlands and Southern California. 
Journal of Risk Research. 2015;1-6. 
[102] Visschers VH. Judgments under uncertainty: evaluations of univocal, 
ambiguous and conflicting probability information. Journal of Risk Research. 2015;1-
9. 
	
